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MEAN FIELD GAMES WITH ERGODIC COST FOR DISCRETE TIME
MARKOV PROCESSES
ANUP BISWAS
Abstract. We consider mean field games with ergodic cost in the framework of a general
discrete time controlled Markov processes. The state space of the processes is given by
a general σ-compact Polish space. Under certain conditions, we show the existence of a
mean field game equilibrium. We also study theN-person game where the players interacts
with each other via their empirical measure. We show that the N-person game has Nash
equilibrium and as N tends to infinity the equilibria converge to a mean field game solution.
1. Introduction
The goal of this article is to give a general framework of discrete time controlled Markov
processes for the analysis of mean field games (MFG) and its connection with N -person
games. Intuitively, mean filed game can be described as follows: there is a single represen-
tative agent whose state dynamics is also effected by an environment distribution coming
from the infinite number of agents. State process of the representative agent can not in-
fluence the environment while solving his/her own optimization problem. Since all agents
are indentical and act in the same way, the distribution of the representative agent should
agree with the environment distribution. Mean field games are introduced independently,
in the seminal work of Huang, Malhame´ and Caines [20] and in the seminal work of Lasry
and Lions [23] where the game dynamics are given by a certain class of large-population
stochastic differential games. In such games, there are N number of (indistinguishable)
players trying to optimize certain cost that depends on the decisions of other players. Since
the objectives are coupled, one naturally look for Nash equilibrium.If the number of agents
N tends to infinity one expects the Nash equilibria to converge to a MFG solution.
There are three major questions of interest in MFG: (1) existence of MFG solution, (2)
uniqueness of MFG solution, and (3) establishing regorous connection with the N -person
games. Either one tries to show that the N -person game Nash equilibrium tends to the
MFG equilibrium ( [3, 5, 12,13,23]) or tries to construct approximate Nash equilibrium for
N -person games from MFG solutions ( [20]). Question of existence has been resolved for
a large class of problems (where the state dynamics are given by controlled diffusions).
Uniqueness results for a general class seems difficult and only available under some mono-
tonicity condition (see Remark 3.1 below).
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Let us now give a quick survey on MFG literature. MFG is a fast growing field. We refer
the readers to the survey articles [9,16] and the book [6] for developments in MFG. A short
account of applications of MFG is given at [18]. For finite horizon type costs, existence
of MFG solution is established in [10] using stochastic maximum principle whereas [22]
considers the set up of controlled martingale problem and shows existence of MFG solution.
Convergence of Nash equilibria of the N -person games to the solution of MFG is obtained
in [13] where the cost function also has finite time horizon. Ergodic type costs are considered
in [3, 5, 12, 23]. In [12, 23], the controlled diffusions take values in a compact metric space
whereas in [3, 5] the state space is the Euclidean space. Convergence of equilibria of N -
person game is also discussed in [3,5,12,23]. All the above mentioned work are done under
the settings of controlled stochastic differential equations. MFG for finite state processes
are studied in [14,15,17,21].
In this article, we consider a general class of discrete Markov processes taking values in a
σ-compact Polish space and the cost function is given by an ergodic cost. We also impose a
blanket (geometric) stability condition on the processes (see (2.2)). This ensure that every
(stationary) controlled Markov process has an invariant measure. Under a set of general
conditions we show the existence of MFG solution. The proof technique uses Kakutani-Fan-
Glicksberg fixed point theorem. To apply this theorem one needs to show that the set valued
map under consideration is upper-hemicontinuous (Lemma 4.3). This is done by showing
equicontinuity property of the value functions for the ergodic control problems. When the
controlled states are governed by non-degenerate diffusion one can use Haranack’s inequality
(see [3]) to establish such estimate. In our setup, we use the minorization condition (see
(2.3)) and the construction of split chain to obtain equicontinuity. We also consider the N -
person game and using Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem we establish existence
of Nash equilibrium. Under an additional convexity assumption (condition (A7)) we show
in Theorem 5.1 that the Nash equilibria converges, as N tends to infinity, to the solution
of MFG.
Therefore to summerize our main contributions in this article:
– we consider the MFG with ergodic cost for a general class of controlled discrete time
Markov chains and show existence of MFG solution;
– we establish existence of N -person game Nash equilibrium;
– we derive the convergence of the Nash equilibria to the MFG solution.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our controlled Markov chain
and the set of assumptions that we impose on our processes. Section 3 states our main
existence result on MFG solution. In Section 4 we discuss the N -person game and prove
existence of Nash equilibrium. Then in Section 5 we prove convergence of Nash equilibria
to MFG solution. Finally, in Section 6 we give the proof of Theorem 3.1.
1.1. Notation. The set of nonnegative real numbers is denoted by R+, N stands for the
set of natural numbers. The interior, closure, the boundary and the complement of a set
A ⊂ X , X is a topological space, are denoted by Ao, A, ∂A and Ac, respectively. 1A denotes
the indicator function of the set A. The open ball of radius R around 0 is denoted by BR.
Given two real numbers a and b, the minimum (maximum) is denoted by a ∧ b (a ∨ b),
respectively. Define a+ := a∨ 0 and a− := −(a∧ 0). By δx we denote the Dirac mass at x.
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Given any Polish space (X ,dX ), we denote by P(X ) the set of probability measures on
X and M(X ) the set of all bounded signed measure on X . For µ ∈ P(X ) and a Borel
measurable map f : X → R, we often use the abbreviated notation
µ(f) :=
∫
X
f dµ .
The total variation norm of a measure µ is denoted by ‖µ‖TV . The Borel σ-algebra on X
is denoted by B(X ). C(X ) (Cb(X )) denotes the set of all real valued (bounded) continuous
functions of X . Law of a random variable X is denoted by L(X). Also κ1, κ2, . . . are used
as generic constants whose values might vary from place to place.
2. Model and Assumptions
Let (X ,dX ) be a Polish space which will be treated as the state space for our controlled
Markov processes. We shall assume that X is σ-compact i.e., X can be written as a countable
union of compact subsets of X . Let (Ω,F ,P) be the probability space on which the random
variables are defined. U is a compact metric space that denotes the control space for the
Markov controls. The controlled stochastic kernels are given by the Borel-measurable map
P (dy|·, ·) : X × U → P(X ). A Markov control is given by a collection of Borel-measurable
maps un : X → U, n ∈ N. Therefore given a Markov control {un}, the controlled Markov
process {Xn} is defined as follows: If Xi = x ∈ X , then the possible location of Xi+1 is
determined by the distribution P (·|x, ui(x)). The set of all Markov controls are denoted by
U. A Markov control is called stationary if un = u, for all n ∈ N, for some Borel-measurable
map u : X → U. Let USM be the set of all stationary Markov controls.
A lower-semicontinuous (lsc) function g : X → R is said to be inf-compact if {x ∈ X :
g(x) ≤ κ} is compact subset of X for all κ ∈ R. Let {Kn} be a collection of compact subsets
in X having following property: if X is compact then Kn = X , otherwise
Kn ⊂ K
o
n+1, and ∪n Kn = X . (2.1)
For a non-negative, lsc function g : X → R+, we denote by o(g) the collection of function
f : X → R that satisfies
lim sup
n→∞
sup
{ |f(x)|
1 + g(x)
: x ∈ X \Kn
}
= 0.
It should be observed that for non-compact X , o(g) does not depend on the choice of family
{Kn} satisfying (2.1). This is due to the fact that ∪K
o
n = X . If X is compact, we have
Kn = X and the supremum of empty set would be assumed to be 0. We shall assume that
(A1) there exists lsc, inf-compact function V : X → R, V ≥ 1, and a compact set C ⊂ X ,
satisfying
sup
u∈U
∫
X
V(y)P (dy|x, u) − V(x) ≤ −β1V(x)1Cc(x) + β2 1C(x), (2.2)
where β1, β2 are positive constants. Moreover, infx∈Cc V(x) ≥ (supx∈C V(x) ∨ 2
β2
β1
).
(2.2) is a standard stability condition and often used to obtain exponential convergence of
the transition probabilities to the invariant measure (see [24]). We also need additional
hypothesis on the controlled Markov processes to ensure that it have invariant measures.
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Let us first introduce randomized policy which helps to establish convexity property of
the set of invariant measures. A randomized (or relaxed) Markov control is given by the
collection of Borel-measurable maps un : X → P(U). We can extend the map of transition
probability measures on P(U) as follows∫
X×U
f(y, u)P (dy|x, v(x)) :=
∫
X×U
f(y, u)P (dy|x, u)v(du|x),
where f : X × U → R is a bounded, Borel-measurable map. Hence we can also define
controlled Markov process associated to these randomized Markov controls. Given a Markov
control v ∈ U, we denote the corresponding controlled Markov chain as {Xn(v)}n≥0. We
note that the elements in U can be seen as randomized Markov controls where un(x) :=
δun(x). We denote the set of all Markov controls (including randomized) by U and by USM
we denote the set of all stationary (including randomized) Markov controls. A stationary
Markov policy given by the map u : X → U is called deterministic stationary Markov
control. The set of all deterministic stationary Markov controls is denoted by UDSM. Thus
we have UDSM ⊂ USM ⊂ U. One can often endow the space USM with a topology that
renders it a compact metric space. We assume that
(A2) there exists a metric dM on USM such that (USM,dM) becomes a compact metric
space. Also, if vn(x) → v(x) as n → ∞, for x ∈ X , for some stationary Markov
controls vn, v ∈ USM, then dM (v
n, v) → 0 , as n → ∞. Furthermore, for every
bounded, continuous f : X × U → R, k ∈ N, the map (x, v) ∈ X × USM 7→
(Ex[f(X1, v(X1))], . . . ,Ex[f(Xk, v(Xk))]) is a continuous.
Let us remark that the above hypothesis (A2) is quiet natural and generally satisfied by
large class of Markov processes. If there is σ-finite, non-negative, regular Borel measure
ι on X , we can define the metric dM on USM viewing it as a subset of the unit ball in
L∞(X ,M(U)) with respect to the measure ι. Note that the unit ball of L∞(X ,M(U)) is
compact (by Banach-Alaoglu theorem) and metrizable (since L1(X , C(U)) is separable). If
X is countable , then we may take ι to be the counting measure. In this case, convergence
in dM is equivalent to the pointwise convergence. See [2, Section 2.4] for a similar discussion
in a particular settings.
For A ∈ B(X ) we define the return time to A as
τ(A) := min{n ≥ 1 : Xn ∈ A}.
We would generally suppress the dependency of the Markov control in the notation of τ.
We shall use the notation Ev for the expectation with respect to the law of the controlled
Markov process {X(v)}. The following assumption ensure that every controlled Markov
process is stable.
(A3) Every controlled Markov process {X(v)}, v ∈ USM, aperiodic, Harris recurrent and
Λ-irreducible, for some non-negative Borel-measure Λ with Λ(X ) > 0. Moreover,
there exists a probability measure ν, ν(C) = 1, such that for any A ∈ B(X ), we
have
inf
u∈U
inf
x∈C
P (A|x, u) ≥ γ ν(A), (2.3)
for some positive constant γ ∈ (0, 1).
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Condition (2.3) is generally referred to as the minorization condition [24]. In view of (2.3),
C is a petit set and thus there exists a unique invariant probability measure for every
controlled Markov process [24, Theorem 13.01]. For v ∈ USM, we have unique invariant
measure ηv such that for all bounded Borel-measurable f : X → R we have∫
X
f(y) ηv(dy) =
∫
X
Ey[X1(v)] ηv(dy).
Define
G := {η ∈ P(X ) : η = ηv for some v ∈ USM}.
Thus G denote the set of all invariant probability measures. By (2.2) we can find κ > 0
such that
sup
µ∈G
∫
X
V(x)µ(dx) < κ. (2.4)
(2.3) also implies that every stationary controlled Markov process is strongly aperiodic.
Condition (2.3) can be seen as the counterpart of the non-degeneracy condition for controlled
diffusion processes. For controlled diffusion, uniform non-degeneracy condition is used to
obtained Harnack inequality and equicontinuity property of the value functions (see [2,3]).
In our set up, condition (2.3) would play a similar role, see Lemma 6.1 below.
Now we introduce the cost function. To do so we need to specify the metric on the
probability space P(X ). Let 0 be a point in X . For p ≥ 1, we define
Pp :=
{
µ ∈ P(X ) :
∫
X
(
dX (x, 0)
)p
µ(dx) <∞
}
.
We observe that if dX is a bounded metric then Pp(X ) = P(X ) for p ≥ 1. We shall assume
that
(A4) for some p ∈ [1,∞), we have
(
dX (·, 0)
)p
∈ o(V), where V is given by (A1).
This condition is used in various places below. One key place where this condition becomes
crucial is to justify certain convergence of measures. Condition (A4) also allows some
flexibility. For example, if we replace dX by dX ∧ 1, we still retain the properties of (X ,dX )
(completeness, σ-compactness, etc), but condition (A4) holds for any p > 0. Now we define
the Wasserstein metric on Pp(X )
Dp(µ1, µ2) := inf
{∫
X×X
(dX (y1, y2))
pΘ(dy1, dy2) : Θ ∈ P(X ×X ) has marginalsµ1, µ2
} 1
p
.
It is well known that (Pp(X ),Dp) is a Polish space for p ≥ 1. If dX is bounded then Dp
gives the metric of weak convergence in P(X ) [26, Theorem 7.12]. The cost function is given
by the map
r : X × U× Pp(X )→ R+.
We assume that r is continuous function. The following assumptions are also imposed on
r:
(A5) (1) for every compact K ⊂ Pp(X ), p is chosen from (A4), we have
sup
(u,µ)∈U×K
r(·, u, µ) ∈ o(V) ;
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(2) there exists lsc functions g0, g1 : X → R+, g0, g1 ∈ o(V), satisfying
r(x, u,
1
N
N∑
i=1
δyi) ≤
(
g0(x) +
1
N
N∑
i=1
g1(yi)
)
, for all u ∈ U, N ≥ 1, (2.5)
and x, y1, . . . , yN ∈ X ;
(3) there exists q ∈ [1, p] such that for any compact K ⊂ X , there exists positive
constant κK satisfying the following: for µ1, µ2 ∈ Pp(X ),
|r(x, u, µ1)−r(x, u, µ2)| ≤ κK
(
1+
∫
X
(
dX (y, 0)
)q
µ1(dy)+
∫
X
(
dX (y, 0)
)q
µ1(dy)
)q′
Dq(µ1, µ2),
(2.6)
for all x ∈ K and u ∈ U where q′ = q−1q . In addition, for any (x, u) ∈ X × U
and any compact set K there exists constant θ, may depend on x, u,K, such
that
|r(x, u,
1
N
∑
δyi)− r(x, u,
1
N − 1
∑
δyi)| ≤
θ
N
, yi ∈ K, i = 1, . . . , N. (2.7)
In Example 2.1 and Example 2.2, we show that assumptions in (A5) are satisfied by a large
class of cost functions. To prove existence of a mean field game solutions we do not need
all the assumptions in (A5). All these conditions are used to justify the convergence of
equilibrium from N -person game to a MFG solution. We also assume that
(A6) if vn → v as n→∞ in (USM,dM ), then ‖ηvn − ηv‖TV → 0 as n→∞ where ηvn , ηv
are the invariant measures corresponding to the stationary Markov controls vn, v,
respectively.
In view of (A1), we note that G is tight and therefore ηvn weakly converges to ηv. If X is
countable (discrete), this implies that ‖ηvn − ηv‖TV → 0 as n→∞.
Let us now give some examples of cost functions that satisfy (A5).
Example 2.1. Let r(x, u, µ) = R(x, u, ζ(x, µ)) where R : X×U×R is a continuous function
and for every compact K ⊂ X there exists constant γK satisfying
|R(x, u, z) −R(x, u, z1)| ≤ γK |z − z1|, for z, z1 ∈ R, (x, u) ∈ K × U. (2.8)
Also suppose that for some g0 ∈ o(V) we have
R(x, u, z) ≤ g0(x) + κ|z|, ∀ x ∈ X , z ∈ R,
for some constant κ > 0. Let m ∈ N be fixed, and ζ(x, µ) is given as follows
ζ(x, µ) :=
∫
X
· · ·
∫
X︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
ϕ(dX (x, yj))Π
m
j=1µ(dyj),
where ϕ : R → R is bounded and Lipschitz continuous. Thus (A5)(2) is satisfied by r.To
see (2.6) holds, we consider µ, µ˜ ∈ P(X ). We let m = 2 for simplicity. Due to (2.8), we
only need to compute the following. Let Θ ∈ P(X ×X ) be such that µ, µ˜ are its marginals.
Then
ζ(x, µ1)− ζ(x, µ) =
∫
X×X
Π2j=1ϕ(dX (x, yj))µ(dy1)µ(dy2)−
∫
X×X
Π2j=1ϕ(dX (x, yj)) µ˜(dy1)µ˜(dy2)
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=
∫
X
ϕ(dX (x, y1))
∫
X 2
(ϕ(dX (x, y2))− ϕ(dX (x, y3)))Θ(dy2, dy3)µ(dy1)
+
∫
X
ϕ(dX (x, y3))
∫
X 2
(ϕ(dX (x, y1))− ϕ(dX (x, y2)))Θ(dy1, dy2)µ˜(dy3)
≤ 2 |ϕ|∞ |ϕ|Lip
∫
X 2
dX (y2, y3)Θ(dy2, dy3),
where |ϕ|∞, |ϕ|Lip denote the supremum norm of ϕ and respectively, the Lipschitz constant
of ϕ. Θ being arbitrary we have (2.6) with q = 1. (2.7) is easy to check.
Example 2.2. Consider r and R as defined in Example 2.1. Define for continuous ϕ :
X × X → R+,
ζ(x, µ) :=
∫
X
ϕ(x, y)µ(dy),
where for some q ∈ [1, p] and x ∈ K, K ⊂ X compact, we have
|ϕ(x, y) − ϕ(x, y1)| ≤ κK (1 + d
q−1
X (0, y) + d
q−1
X (0, y1)) dX (y, y1), (2.9)
for x ∈ K. Also assume that for some g˜0 ∈ o(V) we have
|ϕ(x, y)| ≤ g˜0(x) + g˜0(y), x, y ∈ X . (2.10)
From (2.10) we have ϕ(x, ·) ∈ o(V) uniformly for x in some compact subset of X . We see
from (2.10) that (A2)(2) holds. To see that (A5)(1) holds we note that for any compact
set K ⊂ X , we have supµ∈K
∫
(dX (x, 0))
pµ(dx) <∞ by [26, Theorem 7.12]. Therefore using
(A4) we have supµ∈K
∫
V(x)µ(dx) <∞ which combined with (2.10) gives (A5)(1). Now let
Θ be an element of P(X × X ) with marginals µ, µ˜. Then for x ∈ K, using (2.9) we have
ζ(x, µ)− ζ(x, µ˜) =
∫
X×X
(
ϕ(x, y)− ϕ(x, y1)
)
Θ(dy, dy1)
≤ κK
∫
X×X
(1 + dq−1X (0, y) + d
q−1
X (0, y1)) dX (y, y1)Θ(dy, dy1)
≤ κ1
[ ∫
X×X
(1 + dqX (0, y) + d
q
X (0, y1))Θ(dy, dy1)
] q−1
q
[ ∫
X×X
(dX (y, y1))
qΘ(dy, dy1)
] 1
q
,
where in the last line we use Ho¨lder inequality. Θ begin arbitrary we get from above that
|ζ(x, µ)− ζ(x, µ˜)| ≤ κ1
[
(1 +
∫
X
dqX (0, y)µ(dy) +
∫
X
dqX (0, y) µ˜(dy))
]q′
Dq(µ, µ˜).
Thus (2.6) is satisfied. One can also check that (2.7) holds.
Before we conclude the section let us introduce the Lemma 2.1. For compact set K ⊂ X
containing 0 we define the following map,
P(x) = PK(x) :=
{
x if x ∈ K,
0 otherwise.
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For µ ∈ P(X ), we define µ˜K(B) = µ(P
−1
K (B)) for all B ∈ B(X ). Then the following result
follows by mimicking the arguments in [3, Lemma 4.1] and using (A4), (A5).
Lemma 2.1. Let ε > 0 be given. Then for any compact K ⊂ X , there exists compact
K˜ = K˜(K) ⊂ X such that if (µ1, . . . , µN ) ∈ G
N then
sup
(x,u)∈K×U
∣∣∣ ∫
(X )N
r(x, u,
1
N
N∑
j=1
δyj )Π
N
j=1µj(dyj)−
∫
(X )N
r(x, u,
1
N
N∑
j=1
δyj )Π
N
j=1µ˜j(dyj)
∣∣∣ ≤ ε,
for all N ≥ 1 where µ˜j = (µ˜j)K˜ .
Proof. We note that for xj, yj ∈ X , 1 ≤ j ≤ N , we have for any p ≥ 1,
Dp
(
1
N
∑N
j=1 δxj ,
1
N
∑N
j=1 δyj
)
≤
(
1
N
∑N
i=1(dX (xj , yj))
p
)1/p
. (2.11)
For any compact K˜ we denote µ˜j = (µ˜j)K˜ . Then for all (x, u) ∈ K × U, we have∣∣∣ ∫
XN
r(x, u,
1
N
N∑
j=1
δyj )Π
n
j=1µj(dyj)−
∫
XN
r(x, u,
1
N
N∑
j=1
δyj )Π
n
j=1µ˜j(dyj)
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣ ∫
XN
(
r(x, u,
1
N
N∑
j=1
δyj )− r(x, u,
1
N
N∑
j=1
δP
K˜
(yj))
)
Πnj=1µj(dyj)
∣∣∣
≤ κK
∣∣∣ ∫
XN
((
1 +
1
N
N∑
j=1
(dX (yj , 0))
q +
1
N
N∑
j=1
(dX (PK˜(yj), 0)
q
)q′
Dq
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
δyj ,
1
N
N∑
j=1
δP
K˜
(yj)
))
Πnj=1µj(dyj)
∣∣∣
≤ κK
∣∣∣ ∫
XN
(
1 +
1
N
N∑
j=1
(dX (yj, 0))
q +
1
N
N∑
j=1
(dX (PK˜(yj), 0)
q)
)
ΠNj=1µj(dyj)
∣∣∣q′
×
∣∣∣ ∫
XN
[
Dq
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
δyj ,
1
N
N∑
j=1
δP
K˜
(yj)
)]q
ΠNj=1µj(dyj)
∣∣∣1/q
≤ κ2
∣∣∣ ∫
XN
1
N
N∑
j=1
dX (yj ,PK˜(yj))
q ΠNj=1µj(dyj)
∣∣∣1/q
= κ2
∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
i=1
∫
K˜c
dX (yj, 0)
q µj(dyj)
∣∣∣1/q
where in the third inequality we use (A4), (2.4), (2.11). Now we use (A4) and choose K˜ to
be large enough to satisfy∫
K˜c
(dX (yj , 0))
qµj(dyj) ≤
[ ∫
K˜c
(dX (yj, 0))
pµj(dyj)
] q
p
≤ ε.
Thus combining above to display we have the result. 
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In view of Lemma 2.1, we obtain that for µ1, . . . , µN ∈ G the following map
(x, u) 7→
∫
X×···×X
r(x, u,
1
N
N∑
i=1
δyi)Π
N
i=1µi(dy
i), (2.12)
is continuous.
3. Mean Field Games
In this section we introduce the mean field games (MFG) for the limiting dynamics of
N -person games. The ergodic cost of the player is given by
J(x, v, µ) := lim sup
n→∞
1
n
E
v
x
[ n−1∑
i=0
r(Xi, vi(Xi), µ)
]
. (3.1)
Here v ∈ U and µ ∈ Pp(X ). The goal of the player is to optimize the cost (3.1) given µ.
Define
̺µ := inf
v∈U
J(x, v, µ). (3.2)
Note that ̺µ does not depend on x. The cost being ergodic, it is intuitive that J(x, v, µ)
should depend on the equilibrium distribution of the corresponding process {X(v)}. For
every µ ∈ Pp(X ), we define
rµ : X × U→ R+, as rµ(x, u) = r(x, u, µ).
Our first result is the following
Theorem 3.1. Let (A1)–(A3), (A5)(1) hold. There exists a unique pair (Vµ, ̺) ∈ C(X )×
R, V (0) = 0, V ∈ o(V) that satisfies
Vµ(x) + ̺ = min
u∈U
{
rµ(x, u) +
∫
X
Vµ(y)P (dy|x, u)
}
. (3.3)
Moreover, we have ̺ = ̺µ. The v ∈ USM is optimal for (3.2) if and only if it is a minimizing
selector of (3.3).
Theorem 3.1 is not something new. Ergodic control problems for controlled Markov
chain have been studied vastly in literature (see for example, [4, 19] and the references
therein). In section 6 we obtain a representation formula for Vµ which plays crucial role
in this article. Analogous representation formula under the settings of controlled diffusion
can found in [2]. We use the method of split chain to show that Vµ is in C(X ) and forms a
family of equi-continuous functions if µ lies in a compact subset of Pp(X ).
Thus by Theorem 3.1 we have unique Vµ for every µ ∈ P(X ). Since Vµ ∈ o(V) and∫
X V(y)P (dy|x, u) is finite (by (2.2)) we see that
u 7→
∫
X
Vµ(dy)P (dy|x, u), is continuous,
for every x. Hence there exists a measurable selector of (3.3) by [7, Proposition 7.33]. A
control v ∈ USM is said to be a minimizing selector of (3.3) if
Vµ(x)+̺µ =
∫
U
rµ(x, u)v(du|x)+
∫
X×U
Vµ(y)P (dy|x, u)v(du|x), almost surely ηv . (3.4)
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Since any measurable selector of (3.3) satisfies (3.4), the set of minimizing selector is non-
empty. We define
A(µ) := {η ∈ G : where η = ηv for some minimizing selector v of (3.3)}. (3.5)
Thus µ 7→ A(µ) is set valued.
Definition 3.1. A probability measure η ∈ G is said to be a MFG solution if η ∈ A(η) and
therefore we have a unique Vη ∈ C(X ) ∩ o(V), depending on η, and v ∈ USM satisfying
min
u∈U
{
rη(x, u) +
∫
X
Vη(y)P (dy|x, u)
}
= rη(x, u) +
∫
X
Vη(y)P (dy|x, u)
= ̺η + Vη(x), almost surely η, (3.6)
and, ∫
X
f(dy) η(dy) =
∫
X
Ey[X1(v)] η(dy), for all f ∈ Cb(X ). (3.7)
Thus existence of MFG solution is related to the existence of fixed point to the map
A. (3.6) represents the HJB corresponding to the ergodic control problem with running
cost rη and (3.7) characterizes η as the invariant measure corresponding to v where v is a
minimizing selector of (3.6).
We show that under above assumptions there exists a fixed point.
Theorem 3.2. Assume that (A1)–(A4), (A5)(1), (A6) holds. Then there exists a MFG
solution in the sense of Definition 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.2 is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1. Therefore we defer the proof
until Section 4.
Remark 3.1 (Uniqueness). In this article we are interested in existence of MFG solution
and its relation with the equilibrium of N -person games. However, one can impose L2 type
monotonicity condition (similar to [23]) on r which would give a unique MFG solution in
the sense of Definition 3.1. For v ∈ USM, let us denote η⊛ v(dx, du) = v(du|x)ηv(dx). Now
if we impose the following monotonicity assumption on r,∫
X×U
(
r(x, u, η) − r(x, u, η¯)
)(
η ⊛ v(dx, du) − η¯ ⊛ v¯(dx, du)
)
≤ 0, implies η = η¯,
then one can easily establish the uniqueness of MFG solution (see for example, [9, 23]). In
fact, if the cost is of the form r(x, u, µ) ≡ r1(x, u) + r2(x, µ), then the above monotonicity
condition is similar to the one appeared in [9, 23].
4. N-person Games and Nash Equilibria
In this section we describe the N -person game and show that under above hypothesis
there exists an equilibrium for theN -person game. These equilibriums are the central object
to the mean field games. It is generally expected that the MFG solution could be used to
approximate the N -person game equilibriums. In this article we show that as N → ∞,
the equilibrium solutions for the N -person game tend to the solutions of MFG. N -person
game is described as follows: there are N -independent players, each of them is choosing
his/her controls from U. The choice of control is made independent from the other players.
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Therefore the players does not have access to the full information. The players interact with
each other through their running cost. To introduce the cost we define for x = (x1, . . . , xN ),
x˘i = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN ).
The running cost for the i-th player is given by
rNi (xi, u, x˘i) = r(xi, u,
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
δxj ).
Hence the cost of every player is influenced by the empirical distribution of other players.
Therefore interaction with the other players is weak. Denote
G
N = G× · · · × G.
For pi = (pi1, . . . ,piN ) ∈ G
N , we define
rˆNi (x, u,pi) :=
∫
X×···×X
r(x, u,
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
δyj )Πj 6=ipij(dyj). (4.1)
By (2.12), (x, u) 7→ rˆNi (x, u) is continuous. For pi ∈ G
N and v ∈ U, we define the cost of the
i-th player as
JNi (x, v,pi) := lim sup
n→∞
1
n
E
v
x
[ n−1∑
j=0
rˆNi (Xj , vj ,pi)
]
. (4.2)
Definition 4.1. pi ∈ GN is said be a Nash equilibrium for the N -person game if for every
i ∈ 1, . . . , N we have v(i) ∈ USM satisfying the following
JNi (x, v,pi) ≥ J
N
i (x, v(i),pi), for all x ∈ X , v ∈ U, (4.3)
and if pi = (pi1, . . . ,piN ) then
pii = ηv(i), i.e.,
∫
X
f(y)pii(dy) =
∫
X
E
v(i)
x [f(X1)]pii(dy), (4.4)
for all bounded measurable function f .
By the above definition, existence of Nash equilibrium would imply existence of an equi-
librium environment for every player and no player has anything to gain by changing only
their own equilibrium strategy. The optimality criterion of the equilibrium is understood
through (4.3) and (4.4) shows that the equilibrium strategy leads to the invariant distribu-
tion.
Remark 4.1. The definition of Nash equilibrium in Definition 4.1 weaker than the one used
in [3, 12]. However one can impose mild additional conditions to make them equivalent. A
Nash equilibrium is generally defined to be a collection of (stationary Markov) strategies
(v(1), . . . , v(N)) such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} one has
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
E
[ n−1∑
j=0
rNi
(
X
(i)
j (v), vj ,
1
N − 1
∑
k 6=i
δ
X
(k)
j (v(k))
)]
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≥ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
E
[ n−1∑
j=0
rNi
(
X
(i)
j (v(i)), vj(i),
1
N − 1
∑
k 6=i
δ
X
(k)
j (v(k))
)]
.
Here {X(k)} denotes the controlled process for the k-th player. Since the players are inde-
pendent, it is not hard to show that for some p˜i and v˜ ∈ USM
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
E
[ n−1∑
j=0
rˆNi
(
X
(i)
j (v), vj ,
1
N − 1
∑
k 6=i
δ
X
(k)
j (v(k))
)]
≥
∫
X
rˆNi (y, v˜(y), p˜i)pii(dy),
and pii is the invariant measure corresponding to the control v˜. Using (A1) and (A5) it is
also easy to show that∫
X
rˆNi (y, v˜(y), p˜i)pii(dy) = J
N
i (x, v˜, p˜i), for all x ∈ X .
This also shows that it is enough to minimize over the controls in USM. One the other
hand, if the equilibrium strategies v(i) is in USM for all i, then the joint Markov process
Φ := {X(1)(v(1)), . . . ,X(N)(v(N))} has a unique invariant measure. To show the existence
of unique invariant measure for Φ we observe from (2.2) that there is a stability inequality
for this process and C × · · · × C is a small set with respect to the measure ν × · · · × ν by
(2.3). Since product of invariant measures of {X(i)(v(i)} is an invariant measure we obtain
that the Markov chain Φ recurrent [24, Proposition 10.1.1]. Hence uniqueness of invariant
measure follows from [24, Theorem 10.0.1].
Now if we assume that supp(ν) has non-empty interior, then Φ being irreducible and
aperiodic (with respect to ν × · · · × ν) Markov chain we see that every compact subset of
(X )N is a petit set by [24, Proposition 6.2.8]. Therefore using (A1) and [24, Theorem 14.0.1]
we get
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
E
[ n−1∑
j=0
rNi
(
X
(i)
j (v(i)), vj(i),
1
N − 1
∑
k 6=i
δ
X
(k)
j (v(k))
)]
= JNi (x, v(i),pi)
where pi satisfies (4.4).
Our main result of this section is as follows
Theorem 4.1. Assume that (A1)–(A6) hold. Then there exists a Nash equilibrium in the
sense of Definition 4.1 for the N -person game.
The proof technique of Theorem 4.1 uses fixed point argument. Use of fixed point ar-
gument is quite standard in mean field game theory and it has been used in almost all
the existing works to obtain the existence of Nash equilibrium or MFG solutions. Our
arguments are similar to the one used in [3].
We recall the set G of invariant measures.
G := {η ∈ P(X ) : η = ηv for some v ∈ USM}.
Our next result shows that G is compact and convex.
Lemma 4.1. The set G defined above is a convex set. It is also compact in the topology of
weak convergence.
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Proof. From (2.4) we see that G is tight in P(X ). Since (USM,dM ) is compact, using (A2)
and (A6) we have G compact. To show the convexity we consider ηvi ∈ G for i = 1, 2 where
vi ∈ USM for i = 1, 2. Let η¯ = θηv1 + (1 − θ)ηv2 where θ ∈ [0, 1]. We want to show that
η¯ = ηv for some v ∈ USM. Define
v(du|x) := θ
dηv1
dη¯
(x)v1(du|x) + (1− θ)
dηv2
dη¯
(x)v2(du|x), x ∈ X .
Here
dη
vi
dη¯ (x) denotes the Radon-Nykodim derivative. The above definition makes sense as
without loss of generality we can choose
θ
dηv1
dη¯
(x) + (1− θ)
dηv2
dη¯
(x) = 1, for all x ∈ X .
To complete the proof we need to show that η¯ = ηv where v is given above. To show this
we consider f ∈ Cb(X ). Then∫
X
E
v
y[f(X1)] dη¯ =
∫
X
[
θ
dηv1
dη¯
(y)
∫
X×U
f(z)P (dz|y, u)v1(du|y)
+ (1− θ)
dηv2
dη¯
(y)
∫
X×U
f(z)P (dz|y, u)v2(du|y)
]
η¯(dy)
=
∫
X
θ
∫
X×U
f(z)P (dz|y, u)v1(du|y) ηv1(dy)
+ (1− θ)
dηv2
dη¯
(y)
∫
X×U
f(z)P (dz|y, u)v2(du|y) ηv2(dy)
=
∫
X
f(y) η¯(dy).
By uniqueness of invariant measure we obtain η¯ = ηv. Hence the proof. 
Any element of GN will be denoted in boldface fonts/symbols. For exmaple, pi is an
element in GN whereas pi would denote an element of G. For any pi, recall rˆNi from (4.1).
Using (2.12) and Theorem 3.1 we have for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, a unique pair (V Ni,pi, ̺
N
i,pi) ∈
C(X ) ∩ o(V) ×R, V Ni,pi(0) = 0, satisfing
V Ni,pi(x) + ̺
N
i,pi = min
u∈U
{rˆNi (x, u,pi) +
∫
X
V Ni,pi(y)P (dy|x, u)}, (4.5)
where ̺Ni,pi is the optimal value of J
N
i . Also note that all the stationary Markov controls are
stable due to (A1). By a minimizing selector of (4.5) we mean control v ∈ USM satisfying
V Ni,pi(x)+̺
N
i,pi =
∫
U
rˆNi (x, u,pi)v(du|x)+
∫
X×U
V Ni,pi(y)P (dy|x, u)v(du|x), almost surely ηv .
(4.6)
We note that any deterministic measurable selector of (4.5) satisfies (4.6). Thus the set of
minimizing selector in the sense of (4.6) is non-empty. Given pi ∈ GN , we define A(pi) =
A1 × · · · × AN ⊂ G
N as follows
Ai(pi) := {η ∈ G : η = ηvi where v
i satisfies (4.6)}.
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It is easy to see that existence of fixed point of the map pi 7→ A(pi) would establish Theo-
rem 4.1. We also observe that the definition of A is similar to the map A defined in (3.5).
The next result shows that A(pi) is compact and convex for every pi.
Lemma 4.2. The map pi ∋ GN 7→ A(pi) (6= ∅) is compact (with respect to weak topology)
and convex set valued.
Proof. Form Theorem 3.1 we have
̺Ni,pi =
∫
X×U
rˆNi (y, u,pi)v˜(du|y) ηv˜(dy),
where v˜ is a minimizing selector in the sense of (4.6). Again for ηvi in Ai(pi) and θ ∈ [0, 1],
we can have v satisifying (see the construction in Lemma 4.1)
ηv(dy)v(du|y) = θ ηv1(dy)v
1(du|y) + (1− θ) ηv2(dy)v
2(du|y), and ηv = θηv1 + (1− θ)ηv2 .
Therefore we have
̺Ni,pi =
∫
X×U
rˆNi (y, u,pi)v(du|y) ηv(dy), (4.7)
and thus v is an optimal control. Again using Theorem 3.1 we see that v is a minimizing
selector in the sense of (4.6). Thus ηv ∈ Ai(pi). This shows that Ai(pi) is convex and hence
A(pi) is convex. To establish compactness it is enough to show that each Ai(pi) is compact.
(USM,dM ) and G being compact we only need to show that if vn → v then∫
X×U
f(y, u)vn(du|y)ηvn (dy)→
∫
X×U
f(y, u)v(du|y)ηv(dy), (4.8)
for all f ∈ Cb(X × U). Since by (A5)(2) we have maxu∈U rˆ
N
i (·, u,pi) ∈ o(V), using (4.8) we
get (4.7) which implies that ηv ∈ Ai(pi). To show (4.8) we use (A2) and (A6).∣∣∣ ∫
X×U
f(y, u)vn(du|y)ηvn(dy)−
∫
X×U
f(y, u)v(du|y)ηv(dy)
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣ ∫
X
E
vn
y [f(X1, v
n(X1)]ηvn(dy)−
∫
X
E
v
y[f(X1, v(X1)]ηv(dy)
∣∣∣
≤ ‖f‖∞‖ηvn − ηv‖TV +
∣∣∣ ∫
X
E
vn
y [f(X1, v
n(X1)]ηv(dy)−
∫
X
E
v
y[f(X1, v(X1)]ηv(dy)
∣∣∣
→ 0,
as n → ∞, where in the third line we use (A6) and (A2) with dominated convergence
theorem. This shows that Ai(pi) is compact. Hence the proof. 
Definition 4.2. The map pi 7→ A(pi) is said to be upper-hemicontinuous if for pin → pi as
n→∞, and p˜in ∈ A(pi) for all n, then the sequence {p˜in} has a limit point in A(pi).
Upper-hemicontinuity plays a key role to obtain the fixed point of pi 7→A(pi). The next
result shows that the map is in fact, upper-hemicontinuous.
Lemma 4.3. The map pi 7→A(pi) is upper-hemicontinuous.
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Proof. Let pin → pi as n→∞, and p˜in ∈ A(pin) for all n. Let p˜in = (η1,n, . . . , ηN,n). We fix
i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and consider the family {Vi,pin}. By definition there exists v
i,n ∈ USM such
that
̺Ni,pin =
∫
X×U
rˆNi (y, u,pin)v
i,n(du|y) ηvi,n (dy), (4.9)
ηi,n = ηvi,n , and v
i,n is a minimizing selector of
V Ni,pin(x) + ̺
N
i,pin = minu∈U
{
rˆNi (x, u,pin) +
∫
X
V Ni,pin(y)P (dy|x, u)
}
. (4.10)
GN being compact, we may assume that pin → pi ∈ G
N as n → ∞. In view of (A6) and
Lemma 2.1, we have
rˆNi (x, u,pin)→ rˆ
N
i (x, u,pi), as n→∞,
uniformly over compact subsets of X × U. Otherwise, we can consider a converging sub-
sequence. Therefore by Remark 6.1 we note that the family {V Ni,pin} is locally equicontinuous
and since Vi,pin(0) = 0 the family is also locally bounded. On the other hand, we have from
(A1) that ∫
X
V(y) η(dy) ≤ κ1, for all η ∈ G,
for some constant κ1 > 0. Thus combining (2.5) and (4.9) we obtain that the set {̺
N
i,pin
, i ≥
1, n ∈ N} is compact. Now we argue to show that V Ni,pin ∈ o(V) uniformly in n. Consider
the sequence {Km} in (2.1). Let m be such that C ⊂ Km. An argument similar to (6.29)
gives
V Ni,pin(x) = infv∈UDSM
Ex
[τ(Km)−1∑
i=0
(rˆNi (Xi, v(Xi),pin)− ̺i,pin) + V
N
i,pin(Xτ(Km))
]
, ∀ x ∈ Kcm.
(4.11)
By (6.13), there exists constant κ2 > 0 so that for any x ∈ K
c
m we have
sup
v∈USM
E
v
x
[ τ(Km)−1∑
i=0
V(Xi)
]
≤ κ2 (V(x) + 1). (4.12)
Since sup
pin
supu∈U rˆ
N
i (·, u,pin) ∈ o(V) (by (2.5)) we get from (4.11) and (4.12) that
sup
n
|V Ni,pin | ∈ o(V).
Hence along some subsequence the following holds:
V Ni,pin → V
N
i , in Cloc(X ), ̺
N
i,pin → ̺
N
i , V
N
i ∈ o(V),
vi,n → vi, in (USM,dM ), ‖ηvi,n − ηvi‖TV → 0.
We can pass the limit in (4.9) and (4.10) (see (4.8)) to obtain
V Ni (x) + ̺
N
i = min
u∈U
{rˆNi (x, u,pi) +
∫
X
V Ni (y)P (dy|x, u)},
̺Ni =
∫
X×U
rˆNi (y, u,pi)v
i(du|y) ηvi (dy).
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Hence using Theorem 3.1 we have (V Ni , ̺
N
i ) = (V
N
i,pi, ̺
N
i,pi) and v
i is a minimizing selector of
the above equation. This shows that ηvi ∈ Ai(pi). Hence the proof. 
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We note that pi→A(pi) is non-empty, compact and convex set val-
ued (by Lemma 4.2) where GN is a convex, compact set. We can view GN as a subset of
M(X ) × · · · ×M(X ) which is a locally convex (with respect to weak topology) Hausdorff
space. By Lemma 4.2, Lemma 4.3 and [1, Theorem 17.10] we obtain that the pi → A(pi)
has closed graph. Thus applying Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem [1, Corol-
lary 17.55] we have pi ∈ A(pi). Therefore by definition there exists (v1, . . . , vN ) ∈ (USM)
N
so that for pi = (pi1, . . . ,piN ), we have pii = ηvi and (v
1, . . . , vN ) is a Nash equilibrium in
the sense of Definition 4.1. Hence the proof. 
Remark 4.2. Proof of Theorem 4.1 shows that there exists a Nash equilibrium (v1, . . . , vN ) ∈
(USM)
N such tha vi is a minimizing selector of
V Ni,pi(x) + ̺
N
i,pi = min
u∈U
{
rˆNi (x, u,pi) +
∫
X
V Ni,pi(y)P (dy|x, u)
}
, (4.13)
and ̺i,pi is the optimal value J
N
i (x, v,pi) defined in (4.2). Now let us argue that any Nash
equilibrium in (USM)
N would be minimizing selector of (4.13). Let pi = (pi1, . . . ,piN ) and
(v1, . . . , vN ) forms a Nash equilibrium in the sense of Definition 4.1. Using Theorem 3.1 we
find solution of (4.13). By definition (see (4.3)), we note that vi is an optimal control and
therefore by Theorem 3.1 we see that vi is a minimizing selector of (4.13). This also shows
that pi ∈A(pi).
Now it is easy to guess the proof of Theorem 3.2. One can complete the proof by following
the footsteps of Theorem 4.1. However, we add a sketch of the proof below. Reader may
also like to look at [3] for a similar argument but under controlled diffusion settings.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. We consider the map µ ∈ G 7→ A(µ). By Lemma 4.1, G is compact
and convex and G is also a subset of a locally convex Hausdorff space M(X ). We can also
mimic the arguments of Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.3 in this set up. Rest of of the proof
follows the same argument as above. 
5. Convergence of Nash equilibria
In this section we study the convergence of Nash equilibria which we find in Section 4.
It has been shown in [3, 12,23] that the N -person game Nash equilibrium converges to the
solution of MFG. Similar results are known for controlled diffusion processes with ergodic
costs. To justify the limit we need to have some kind of uniqueness of the limiting equilibria.
Such uniqueness is generally obtained by imposing convexity property on the Hamiltonian.
To do so we define for µ = (µ1, . . . , µN ) ∈ G
N ,
rNµ (x, u) :=
∫
(X )N
r(x, u,
1
N
N∑
j=1
δyj )Π
N
j=1µj(dyj).
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Consider the unique pair (V N
µ
, ̺N
µ
) ∈ C(X ) ∩ o(V)× R+, V
N
µ
(0) = 0, that satisfies
V N
µ
(x) + ̺N
µ
= min
u∈U
{
rN
µ
(x, u) +
∫
X
V N
µ
(y)P (dy|x, u)
}
. (5.1)
Existence of such unique pair is guaranteed by Theorem 3.1. We assume that
(A7) U is a convex set. Moreover, for every x ∈ X , the following map
u 7→ rNµ (x, u) +
∫
X
V Nµ (y)P (dy|x, u),
is strictly convex, uniformly in N , where V Nµ is given by (5.1).
It should be observed that µ depends on N and might vary with N . By (A7), for every
x ∈ X and θ ∈ (0, 1) there exists a positive constant κx, independent of N , such that for
all u, u1 ∈ U, we have
rNµ (x, θu+ (1− θ)u1) +
∫
X
V Nµ (y)P (dy|x, θu+ (1− θ)u1)
≥ θ
[
rN
µ
(x, u) +
∫
X
V N
µ
(y)P (dy|x, u)
]
+ (1− θ)
[
rN
µ
(x, u1) +
∫
X
V N
µ
(y)P (dy|x, u1)
]
− κx.
Our main result of this section is the following.
Theorem 5.1. Let (A1)–(A7) hold. Let {V Ni,pi, ̺
N
i,pi,pi
N : 1 ≤ i ≤ N} form a Nash equi-
librium in the sense that (V Ni,pi, ̺
N
i,pi,pi) satisfy (4.13) and (v
1, . . . , vN ) ∈ (USM)
N satisfies
ηvi = pi
N
i for all i. Then the following holds:
(i) the family {V Ni,pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N,N ≥ 1} is locally equicontinuous and locally bounded.
{̺Ni,pi,pi
N
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N} is also pre-compact in R× P(X );
(ii) for any compact K ⊂ X , we have
sup
1≤i,j≤N
(
sup
x∈K
|V Ni,pi(x)− V
N
j,pi(x)|+ |̺
N
i,pi − ̺
N
j,pi|+ ‖pi
N
i − pi
N
j ‖TV
)
→ 0,
as N →∞;
(iii) any subsequential limit (V, ̺,pi) of {V Ni,pi, ̺
N
i,pi,pi
N
i } forms a MFG solution in the sense
of Definition 3.1.
From (A7) we note that there exists a unique continuos measurable selector (4.13). In
fact, this is the only minimizing selector. This follows from the definition of minimizing
selector (4.6) and (A7). In view of Remark 4.2 we see that every Nash equilibrium of N -
person game converges to a solution of MFG. Under diffusion settings, convexity assumption
on the Hamiltonian helps to conclude that that the optimal distributions of Nash equilibrium
converges to each other as N →∞ (see [3,12]). (A7) play similar role in our setting. Similar
convexity property is also assumed in [14,15] but for finite state process.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. (i) Using (2.2) we can find constant κ1 such that∫
X
V(y) ηv(dy) ≤ κ1, for all v ∈ USM. (5.2)
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Since h is inf-compact, we have {piNi , 1 ≤ i ≤ N}N≥1 pre-compact in P(X ). Again
by [24, Theorem 14.0.1] we have
̺Ni,pi =
∫
X
rˆNi (y, v
i(y),pi) ηvi(dy).
Thus using (2.5) and (5.2) we have {̺Ni,pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N,N ≥ 1} bounded. Now we show that
{V Ni,pi} is locally equicontinuous family. Fix K ⊂ X compact. r : K × U × P(K) → R
being continuous, we obtain that for every K ⊂ X compact, the following maps forms a
equicontinuous family for 1 ≤ i ≤ N, N ≥ 1,
(x, u) 7→
∫
(X )N
r(x, u,
1
N
N∑
j=1
δPC(yj))Π
N
j=1νj(dyj) =
∫
(K)N
r(x, u,
1
N
N∑
j=1
δyj )Π
N
j=1ν˜j(dyj),
where νj ∈ P(C). The above result is due to the fact that
1
N
∑N
j=1 δyj ∈ P(C). Thus using
Lemma 2.1 we see that {rˆNi } forms a locally equicontinuous family. From Section 6 we
know that the value function V Ni,pi is the limit of V
α,N
i,pi (·)− V
α,N
i,pi (0) where
Jα,Ni,pi (x, v) = Ex
[ ∞∑
j=0
αj rˆNi (Xj(v), v(Xj),pi)
]
, and, V α,Ni,pi (x) = inf
v∈USM
Jα,Ni,pi (x, v).
By Lemma 6.1 and Remark 6.1, we obtain that {V α,Ni,pi (·) − V
α,N
i,pi (0) : 1 ≤ i ≤ N,N ≥ 1}
forms a locally equicontinuous family and thus {V Ni,pi} is locally equicontinuous.
(ii) Now we consider the unique pair (V˜ N , ˜̺N ) ∈ C(X ) ∩ o(V)× R that satisfies
V˜ N (x) + ˜̺N = min
u∈U
{r˜N (x, u) +
∫
X
V˜ N (y)P (dy|x, u)}, (5.3)
where
r˜N(x, u) :=
∫
(X )N
r(x, u,
1
N
N∑
j=1
δyj )Π
N
i=1 pij(dyj).
By Theorem 3.1 and (5.3), ˜̺N is the optimal ergodic value with running cost r˜N . We also
know that the following holds.
̺Ni,pi = inf
{∫
X
rˆNi,pi(y, v(y)) ηv(dy) : v ∈ USM
}
, ˜̺N = inf
{∫
X
r˜N(y, v(y)) ηv(dy) : v ∈ USM
}
.
(5.4)
Hence by (5.4), we obtain
|̺Ni,pi − ˜̺
N | ≤ sup
v∈USM
{∫
X
|rˆNi,pi(y, v(y)) − r˜
N(y, v(y))| ηv(dy)
}
. (5.5)
Now for any compact K ⊂ X , we have a constant κ2 = κ2(K) such that for any N -tuple
(y1, . . . , yN ) ∈ K × · ×K, we have
Dp(
1
N − 1
N−1∑
j=1
δyj ,
1
N
N∑
j=1
δyj ) ≤
κ2
N
1
p
. (5.6)
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On the other hand, P(K) is a compact subset of P(X ). Thus using (2.5), (5.2), (5.5), (5.6)
and Lemma 2.1 we see that
sup
1≤i≤N
|̺Ni,pi − ˜̺
N | → 0, as N →∞. (5.7)
Let K ⊂ X be compact. From (6.26) we know that for any κ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a constant
bκ satisfying
sup
v∈USM
(
E
v
x[V(Xτ(Bκ))] + β1 E
v
x
[ τ(Bκ)−1∑
j=0
V(Xj)
])
≤ V(x) + bκ. (5.8)
On the other hand, by (6.29) we have
V Ni,pi(x) = min
v∈UDSM
Ex
[τ(Bκ)−1∑
j=0
(rˆNi,pi(Xj , v(Xj))− ̺
N
i,pi) + V
N
i,pi(Xτ(Bκ))
]
,
V˜ N (x) = min
v∈UDSM
Ex
[τ(Bκ)−1∑
j=0
(r˜N (Xj , v(Xj))− ˜̺
N + V˜ N (Xτ(Bκ))
]
.
(5.9)
Therefore using (5.9) we obtain that
|V Ni,pi(x)− V˜
N (x)| ≤ sup
v∈UDSM
∣∣∣Ex[τ(Bκ)−1∑
j=0
(rˆNi,pi(Xj , v(Xj))− r˜
N (Xj , v(Xj)) + ˜̺
N − ̺Ni,pi)
]∣∣∣
+ sup
y∈Bκ
|V Ni,pi(y)− V˜
N (y)|. (5.10)
To prove (ii) it is enough to show that for any ε > 0 we can find N0 large so that
sup
x∈K
|V Ni,pi(x)− V˜
N (x)| ≤ ε, ∀ N ≥ N0, ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (5.11)
We use (5.8) and (5.10) to establish (5.11). We may use arguments similar to (i) to conclude
that the family {V˜ N , N ≥ 1} is locally equicontinuous and bounded. Therefore we can find
κ > 0 small so that
sup
y∈Bκ
|V Ni,pi(y)− V˜
N (y)| ≤ ε/4, ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (5.12)
where we use the fact that V˜ N (0) = V Ni,pi(0) = 0. From (2.5) and (5.2) we note that
sup1≤i≤N supu∈U rˆ
N
i,pi(·, u) ∈ o(V), supu∈U r˜
N (·, u) ∈ o(V) uniformly in N . Thus we can find
a cut-off function ψ that vanishes outside a compact subset of X and
sup
v∈UDSM
∣∣∣Ex[τ(Bκ)−1∑
j=0
(1−ψ(Xj))
(
rˆNi,pi(Xj , v(Xj))− r˜
N (Xj , v(Xj))
)
+ ˜̺N − ̺Ni,pi)
]∣∣∣ ≤ ε/4,
(5.13)
using (5.7), (5.8) and,
sup
v∈UDSM
∣∣∣Ex[τ(Bκ)−1∑
j=m
ψ(Xj)(rˆ
N
i,pi(Xj , v(Xj))− r˜
N (Xj , v(Xj))
]∣∣∣ ≤ ε/4, (5.14)
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for large N where we use Lemma 2.1, (5.6), (5.8). Thus we have (5.11) from (5.12), (5.13)
and (5.14). The proof of the fact
sup
1≤i,j≤N
‖piNi − pi
N
j ‖TV → 0, as N →∞, (5.15)
is a byproduct of (iii) below.
(iii) Let (V, ̺,pi) be any subsequential limit of {V Ni,pi, ̺
N
i,pi,pi
N
i } as N → ∞. We have
already seen that
|rˆNi,pi − r˜
N | → 0, |V − V˜ N | → 0,
uniformly on every compact sets, along the subsequence of N . Using (5.8) and (5.9) it
is easy to see that V˜ N ∈ o(V) uniformly in N (see for example (6.20) in Section 6). By
Lemma 2.1 it is easy to see that {r˜N , N ≥ 1} is a family of locally equicontinuous functions.
Hence letting N →∞ in (5.3) we obtain
V (x) + ̺ = min
u∈U
{
r˜(x, u) +
∫
X
V (y)P (dy|x, u)
}
(5.16)
where V (0) = 0, V ∈ o(V) and r˜N → r˜(x, u). Now we identify r˜. From (A7) we note that
u 7→ r˜(x, u) +
∫
X
V (y)P (dy|x, u)
is a strictly convex function. Therefore there exists a unique minimizing selector v. More-
over, it is easy to see that the minimizing selector in (5.3) converges to v. Thus from (A6)
we have that ‖piNi − ηv‖TV → 0 as N → ∞. Thus one can use similar argument as above
to establish (5.15) (see also [3]) using unique property of the solution of (5.16) and also the
minimizing selector. We claim that
r˜(x, u) = r(x, u, ηv). (5.17)
This would prove (iii) since by (5.16)
̺ =
∫
X
r˜(x, v(x))ηv(dx).
But the above is a consequence of Lemma 2.1 and Hewitt-Savage theorem (see [3], [12]).
This can be achieved in two steps. (1) show that for any compact K ⊂ X ,
|
∫
(X )N
r(x, u,
1
N
N∑
j=1
δyj )Π
N
j=1pi
N
j (dyj)−
∫
(X )N
r(x, u,
1
N
N∑
j=1
δyj )Π
N
j=1η˜(dyj)| → 0,
as N → ∞ where piNj = (pi
N
j )K and η˜ = (ηv)K . One may follow the calculations of [12,
p. 530] together with (2.7) to achieve this. (2) Then apply Hewitt-Savage theorem to obtain
that ∫
(X )N
r(x, u,
1
N
N∑
j=1
δyj )Π
N
j=1η˜(dyj)→ r(x, u, η˜),
as N → ∞. Now to get (5.17) apply Lemma 2.1 and the fact that Dp(η˜, η) → 0, as K
increases to X . 
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6. Proof of Theorem 3.1
In this section we prove Theorem 3.1. As we mentioned earlier that existence result of
(3.3) is well known for very general class of controlled processes. Reader may wish to look
at [4,7,19] for more details about these problems. Using the method of split chain we show
that the value function is continuous.
For α ∈ (0, 1), we define the α-discounted value function as follows. For v ∈ U,
Jαµ (x, v) = Ex
[ ∞∑
i=0
αi rµ(Xi(v), vi(Xi))
]
, and, V αµ (x) = inf
v∈U
Jαµ (x, v). (6.1)
Then by (A2) and [4] we have that V αµ is lsc and
V αµ (x) := inf
u∈U
{
rµ(x, u) + α
∫
X
V αµ (y)P (dy|x, u)
}
(6.2)
Also a control v ∈ UDSM is optimal for (6.1) if and only if v(x) attains the infimum in (6.2),
for all x ∈ X .
Lemma 6.1. The family of functions {V αµ , α ∈ (0, 1)} is equicontinuous on every compact
subsets of X .
To prove Lemma 6.1 we construct split chain. Let Y = X ×X and x¯ = (x1, x2) ∈ Y. For
u¯ = (u1, u2) ∈ U× U, we define P¯ (·|x¯, u¯) ∈ P(Y) as
P¯ (B1 ×B2|x¯, u¯) = P (B1|x1, u1)P (B2|x2, u2), Bi ∈ B(X ). (6.3)
Let v ∈ USM be a stationary Markov control. By {X
k
i } := {X
k
i (v)} we denote the Markov
chain with Xk0 = xk for k = 1, 2. We assume that {X
1
i } and {X
2
i } are independent of each
other. In fact, this can be achieved by constructing a Y valued Markov chain X¯ = {X1i ,X
2
i }
with transition probability given by (6.3) and control v¯(y1, y2) := (v(y1), v(y2)).
6.1. The pseudo-atom construction. Now we introduce the Athreya-Ney-Nummelin
construction of pseudo-atom. Readers are referred to [24] for more details on such con-
struction. We recall the measure ν and the set C from (2.3). Denote C¯ = C × C and
U¯ = U× U. Define ν¯ ∈ P(C¯) as ν¯ = ν × ν. It is easy to see from (2.3) that
inf
x¯∈C×C
inf
u¯∈U×U
P¯ (A|x¯, u¯) ≥ γ2 ν¯(A), A ∈ B(Y). (6.4)
To see this, denote by Az1 = {z2 : z¯ ∈ A} and Az2 = {z1 : z¯ ∈ A}. These are Borel-
measurable sets by [25, Theorem 8.2]. Then by [25, Theorem 8.6] we have for x¯ ∈ C¯,
u¯ ∈ U¯,
P (A|x¯, u¯) =
∫
X
P (Az1 |x2, u2)P (dz1|x1, u1)
≥ γ
∫
X
ν(Az1)P (dz1|x1, u1)
= γ
(
ν × P (·|x1, u1)
)
(A)
= γ
∫
X
P (Az2 |x1, u1)ν(dz2)
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≥ γ2
∫
X
ν(Az2)ν(dz2) = γ
2ν¯(A).
Therefore the Markov chain X¯ satisfies minorization condition (6.4) with minorizing mea-
sure ν¯. Let γ1 =
γ2
2 . Let Y
∗ = Y × {0, 1} = X × X × {0, 1}. For B ∈ B(Y), we denote
B0 = B × {0} and B1 = B × {1}. For µ ∈ P(Y) we define µ
∗ ∈ P(Y∗) as follows. For
B ∈ B(Y),
µ∗(B0) = (1− γ1)µ(B ∩ C¯) + µ(B ∩ C¯
c),
µ∗(B1) = γ1 µ(B ∩ C¯).
(6.5)
Clearly, µ∗(B0) + µ
∗(B1) = µ(B) and if B ⊂ C¯
c, then µ∗(B0) = µ(B). On a suitable
probability space (Ω∗,F∗,P∗), we define an Y∗ valued Markov chain Zn ≡ (X
∗
n, i
∗
n), where
X∗n = (X
1,∗
n ,X
2,∗
n ) ∈ Y, such that
(1) The probability kernel of {Zn} is given as follows. For zˆ = (z¯, i) ∈ Y
∗,
Pˆ (dyˆ|zˆ) =


P¯ ∗(dyˆ|z¯, v¯(z¯)) if zˆ ∈ Y0 \ C¯0,
1
1−γ1
(P¯ ∗(dyˆ|z¯, v¯(z¯))− γ1 ν¯
∗(dyˆ)) if zˆ ∈ C¯0,
ν¯∗(dyˆ) if zˆ ∈ Y1.
(6.6)
(2) The initial distribution is given as follows. For B ∈ B(Y),
P
∗(Z0 ∈ B0) = (1− γ1)1B∩C¯ (x¯) + 1B∩C¯c(x¯),
P
∗(Z0 ∈ B1) = γ1 1B∩C¯(x¯).
It is well known that under above construction the probability laws of {X∗n}n≥1 and {X¯n}n≥1
are same [24]. We also observe that if the Markov chain {Zn} starts from Y
∗ \ C¯c × {1} it
stays in Y∗ \ C¯c×{1}. The transition probability from C¯1 is same for all point in C¯1. That
is why C¯1 is referred to as a pseudo-atom. Denote
τ∗ := inf{n > 0 : Zn ∈ C¯1}.
By our construction we see that the law of {X1,∗τ∗+n}n≥1 and {X
2,∗
τ∗+n}n≥1 are same (see
also [8]).
Lemma 6.2. There exist a constant θ > 0, independent of x¯ and v ∈ USM, satisfying
E
∗
zˆ
[ τ∗∑
i=0
V(X1,∗i ) + V(X
2,∗
i )
]
≤ θ(V(x1) + V(x2) + 1), (6.7)
for zˆ = (x1, x2, i) ∈ Y0 ∪ C¯1.
Proof. Define V¯(x¯) = V(x1) + V(x2). Then from (2.2) we have∫
Y
V¯ (y¯) P¯ (dy¯|x¯, u¯)− V¯(x¯) ≤ −V˘(x¯) + κ1C¯(x¯), (6.8)
for some constant κ > 0, where V˘(x¯) = β14 (V(x1) + V(x2)). Define
τ¯ = inf{n ≥ 1 : X¯n ∈ C¯},
τ1 = inf{n ≥ 1 : X
∗
n ∈ C¯}.
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By above property of split Markov chain we have
E¯x¯[τ¯] = E
∗
δ∗x¯
[τ1],
where δ∗x¯ is defined as in (6.5). Using (6.8) we can find constant κ1 satisfying (see for
example, [24, Theorem 14.2.2])
E¯x¯
[ τ¯−1∑
i=0
V˘(X¯i)
]
≤ κ1(V¯(x¯) + 1).
Thus for any zˆ = (z¯, i) ∈ Y0 ∪ C¯1 we have from above that
E
∗
zˆ
[ τ1−1∑
i=0
V˘(X∗i )
]
≤
κ1
γ1 ∧ (1− γ1)
(V¯(z¯) + 1). (6.9)
Now define a sequence of stopping times {ϑk} as ϑ0 = 0 and ϑk = inf{n > ϑk−1 : X
∗
n ∈ C¯}.
By (6.9) we have P∗zˆ(ϑk < ∞) = 1 for all k ∈ N and zˆ ∈ Y0 ∪ C¯1. Denote by Fn = σ{Zi :
i ≤ n}. Then
P
∗
zˆ(τ
∗ > ϑk) = P
∗
zˆ(τ
∗ > ϑk, τ
∗ > ϑk−1)
= E∗
[
1{τ∗>ϑk−1} P
∗
zˆ(τ
∗ > ϑk|Fϑk−1)
]
≤ E∗
[
1{τ∗>ϑk−1} sup
zˆ∈C¯0
P
∗
zˆ(τ
∗ > 1)
]
≤ [ sup
zˆ∈C¯0
P
∗
zˆ(τ
∗ > 1)]k−1. (6.10)
For z¯ ∈ C¯ we have from (6.4), (6.6) that
P
∗
(z¯,0)(τ
∗ = 1) =
1
1− γ1
(γ1P¯ (C¯|z¯, v(z¯))− γ
2
1 ν¯(C¯)) ≥
γ21
(1− γ1)
:= γ2 ∈ (0, 1).
Hence (6.10) gives us that
P
∗
zˆ(τ
∗ > ϑk) ≤ (1− γ2)
k−1. (6.11)
Letting k →∞ in (6.11) we find that P∗zˆ(τ
∗ <∞) = 1. Let
H(ϑk) :=
ϑk−1∑
i=0
V˘(X∗i ).
Then for zˆ = (z¯, i) ∈ Y0 ∪ C¯1 we get
E
∗
zˆ[
τ∗−1∑
i=0
V˘(X∗i )] = E
∗
zˆ
[ ∞∑
k=0
1{τ∗=ϑk}H(ϑk)
]
= E∗zˆ
[ ∞∑
k=0
1{τ∗=ϑk}
k−1∑
l=0
(H(ϑl+1)−H(ϑl))
]
= E∗zˆ
[ ∞∑
l=0
1{τ∗≥ϑl+1}(H(ϑl+1)−H(ϑl))
]
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≤ κ3(1 + V(z¯)) + E
∗
zˆ
[ ∞∑
l=1
1{τ∗>ϑl}(H(ϑl+1)−H(ϑl))
]
≤ κ3(1 + V(z¯)) + E
∗
zˆ
[ ∞∑
l=1
1{τ∗>ϑl} sup
zˆ∈C¯×{0,1}
E
∗
zˆ[H(ϑ1)]
]
≤ κ3(1 + V(z¯)) + κ4
∑
l≥1
(1− γ2)
l−1
≤ κ5(1 + V(z¯)),
for some constants κ3, κ4, κ5, where in the sixth line we use (6.9), (6.11). This proves (6.7)
since V˘ is bounded on C¯. 
Next Lemma establishes moment estimate of τ∗.
Lemma 6.3. For any compact set K ⊂ X we can find positive constants δ1, κK such that
sup
v∈USM
E
∗
zˆ[e
δ1 τ∗ ] ≤ κK for all zˆ ∈ K0 ∪ C1.
Proof. Applying [24, Theorem 15.2.5] and (6.8) we can find δ2 > 0 such that
sup
v∈USM
E¯z¯[e
δ2 τ] ≤ κ1(V¯(z¯) + 1), (6.12)
for some constant κ1. Therefore from the property of Markov chain and (6.12) can choose
δ3 small enough to satisfy
sup
z¯∈C¯
sup
v∈USM
E
∗
(z¯,i)[e
δ3τ1 ] <
1
1− γ1
.
Then the result follows from [11, Proposition 4] (see also [8, Lemma 4.7]). 
The next lemma will be useful to show that the solution is in o(V).
Lemma 6.4. For any compact K ⊃ C, The function x 7→ supv∈USM E
v
x[τ(K)] is in o(V).
Proof. Define G(x) := supv∈USM E
v
x[τ(K)]. Thus using (2.2) we have (see [24, Theorem
14.2.2])
sup
v∈USM
E
v
x[
τ(K)−1∑
i=0
V(Xi)] ≤ κ1(V(x) + 1), (6.13)
for some constant κ1. In fact, the constant κ1 is independent of any compact K containing
C. Therefore we only need to consider the case when X is not compact. Let ε > 0. Consider
Kn ⊃ K and let x ∈ K
c
n. Then we have for all v ∈ USM
E
v
x[τ(K)] = E
v
x[τ(K)− τ(Kn)] + E
v
x[τ(Kn)]
≤ sup
x∈Kn
E
v
x[τ(K)] +
1
infKcn V
E
v
x[
τ(Kn)−1∑
i=0
V(Xi)]
≤ sup
x∈Kn
E
v
x[τ(K)] +
1
infKcn V
κ1(V(x) + 1).
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Therefore we can choose n large enough to satisfy the following
G(x) ≤ κε + ε (V(x) + 1), for all x ∈ X .
ε being arbitrary we get from the above expression that G ∈ o(V). 
Now we are ready to prove Lemma 6.1.
Proof of Lemma 6.1. Consider a compact subset K of X and x1, x2 ∈ K. Let v
α ∈ UDSM
be a minimizer selector of (6.2). Then we have
V αµ (x) = Ex
[ ∞∑
i=0
αi rµ(Xi, v
α(Xi))
]
,
for all x. Therefore
V αµ (x) = min
v∈USM
J(x, v).
For v ∈ USM, define
J˜(x, v) := Ex
[ ∞∑
i=1
αirµ(Xi, v(Xi))
]
.
Hence
|V αµ (x1)− V
α
µ (x2)| ≤ max
u∈U
|rµ(x1, u)− rµ(x2, u)|+ sup
v∈USM
|J˜(x1, v)− J˜(x2, v)|. (6.14)
Thus to show equicontinuity we only need to show that the second term on the rhs of (6.14)
is small whenever dX (x1, x2) is small. Let {Kn} be the increasing sequence of compact
subsets in X chosen in (2.1). Let ψn : X → [0, 1] be a Lipschitz continuous function with
property that ψn = 1 on Kn and vanishes on K
c
n+1. Consider ε > 0. Let v ∈ USM. Then
we can choose n large enough so that
Ex1
[ ∞∑
i=1
αi(1−ψn(Xi))rµ(Xi, v(Xi))
]
− Ex2
[ ∞∑
i=1
αi(1−ψn(Xi))rµ(Xi, v(Xi))
]
= E∗δ∗x¯
[ ∞∑
i=1
αi(1−ψn(X
1,∗
i ))rµ(X
1,∗
i , v(X
1,∗
i ))− α
i(1−ψn(X
2,∗
i ))rµ(X
2,∗
i , v(X
2,∗
i ))
]
= E∗δ∗x¯
[ τ∗∑
i=1
αi
(
(1−ψn(X
1,∗
i ))rµ(X
1,∗
i , v(X
1,∗
i ))− (1−ψn(X
2,∗
i ))rµ(X
2,∗
i , v(X
2,∗
i ))
)]
≤ 4 sup
x∈Kcn
supu∈U rµ(x)
V(x)
E
∗
δ∗x¯
[ τ∗∑
i=1
V˘(X∗i )
]
< ε/4, (6.15)
where in the last line we use Lemma 6.2. We fix n from above. For k ∈ N, we calculate
Ex1
[ ∞∑
i=k
αiψn(Xi)rµ(Xi, v(Xi))
]
− Ex2
[ ∞∑
i=k
αiψn(Xi)rµ(Xi, v(Xi))
]
= E∗δ∗x¯
[ ∞∑
i=k
1{k≤τ∗}α
i
(
ψn(X
1,∗
i )rµ(X
1,∗
i , v(X
1,∗
i ))−ψn(X
2,∗
i )rµ(X
2,∗
i , v(X
2,∗
i ))
)]
26 ANUP BISWAS
= E∗δ∗x¯
[ τ∗∑
i=k
1{k≤τ∗}α
i
(
ψn(X
1,∗
i )rµ(X
1,∗
i , v(X
1,∗
i ))−ψn(X
2,∗
i )rµ(X
2,∗
i , v(X
2,∗
i ))
)]
≤ κn E
∗
δ∗x¯
[(τ∗ − k)+],
where κn := 2 sup(x,u)∈Kn+1×U rµ(x, u). Therefore using Lemma 6.3 we can choose k large
enough so that
Ex1
[ ∞∑
i=k
αiψn(Xi)rµ(Xi, v(Xi))
]
− Ex2
[ ∞∑
i=k
αiψn(Xi)rµ(Xi, v(Xi))
]
≤ ε/4. (6.16)
Fix k as choosen above. Note that the above choice of n and k is independent of v ∈ USM.
Now using (A2) it is clear that if dX (x1, x2) is small enough then we have∣∣∣Evx1 [ k∑
i=1
αiψn(Xi(v))rµ(Xi, v(Xi))
]
− Evx2
[ k∑
i=1
αiψn(Xi(v))rµ(Xi, v(Xi))
]∣∣∣ ≤ ε/4,
(6.17)
for all v ∈ USM. Thus combining (6.14), (6.15), (6.16) and (6.17) we see that there exists
δ > 0 such that
|V αµ (x1)− V
α
µ (x2)| < ε, whenever dX (x1, x2) ≤ δ, x1, x2 ∈ K.
Hence the proof. 
Remark 6.1. In fact, the proof Lemma 6.1 shows that if K ⊂ P(X ) is compact then the
family {V αµ , α ∈ (0, 1), µ ∈ K} is equicontinuous on every compact subsets of X . To see
this, we observe that the estimate (6.15) holds uniformly in µ ∈ K by (A5)(1). Again for
any compact set K1 ⊂ X we have
sup
(x,u)∈K1×U
|rµ(x, u)− rµn(x, u)| → 0, if Dp(µ, µn)→ 0.
Thus using (A2) we can have (6.17) uniformly in µ ∈ K.
Define V¯ αµ (x) := V
α(x)− V α(0). Thus by Lemma 6.1 we obtain {V¯ αµ , α ∈ (0, 1)} locally
bounded and locally equicontinuous. On the other hand, from (2.2) we have for α ∈ (0, 1)
and v ∈ U that
E
v
x[α
kV(Xk)]− V(x) =
k∑
i=1
αi Eux[V(Xi)]− α
i−1
E
u
x[V(Xi−1)]
≤
k∑
i=1
αi−1(Eux[V(Xi)]− E
u
x[V(Xi−1)])
≤
k∑
i=1
αi−1
(
β21C(Xi−1)− β1 E
u
x[h(Xi−1)]
)
.
Therefore letting k →∞, and using the fact that V ≥ 1, we get
β1
∞∑
i=0
αi Eux[h(Xi)] ≤ V(x) +
β2
1− α
. (6.18)
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Since maxu∈U rµ(·, u) ∈ o(V), we have from (6.18) that for every compact K ⊂ X
(1− α)V αµ (x) ≤ κ1, (6.19)
for some constant κ1, depending on K. Therefore we can extract a subsequence of {α}
tending to 1 so that as α→ 0,
V¯ αµ → Vµ, and, (1− α)V
α
µ (x)→ ̺, ∀ x ∈ X .
Now we intend to pass the limit in (6.2). To justify the limit we need to it is enough to show
that V¯ αµ ∈ o(V),uniformly in α. This can be achieved by Lemma 6.4. Let ε > 0 be given.
We consider the sequence {Kn} from (2.1). Fix some n with Kn ⊃ C, and let x ∈ K
c
n.
Since vα is a minimising selector, we get
|V¯ αµ (x)| =
∣∣∣Ex [ ∞∑
i=0
αirµ(Xi, v
α(Xi))
]
− V αµ (0)
∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣Ex [ τ(Kn)−1∑
i=0
αirµ(Xi, v
α(Xi))
]∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣Ex [ατ(Kn)V αµ (Xτ(Kn))]− V αµ (0)∣∣∣
≤ sup
Kcn
supu∈U rµ(x, u)
V(x)
Ex
[ τ(Kn)−1∑
i=0
αiV(Xi)
]
+
∣∣∣Ex [(ατ(Kn) − 1)V αµ (Xτ(Kn))]∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣V αµ (Xτ(Kn))− V αµ (0)∣∣∣
≤ sup
Kcn
supu∈U rµ(x, u)
V(x)
κ1(V(x) + 1) + Ex[τ(Kn)] sup
x∈Kn
(1− α)V αµ (x) + sup
x∈Kn
V¯ αµ (x),
where in third inequality we use (6.13) and the inequality (1 − zm) ≤ m(1 − z) for all
z ∈ [0, 1], m ∈ N. Now choose n large enough and apply (6.19) to get
|Vµ(x)| ≤ κε + εV(x) + sup
v∈USM
Ex[τ(Kn)], for all x ∈ X . (6.20)
ε being arbitrary, applying Lemma 6.4 we have from (6.20) that V αµ ∈ o(V) uniformly in
α ∈ (0, 1). This shows Vµ ∈ o(V). Thus we obtain that every sub sequential limit of {V¯
α
µ }
satisfies
Vµ(x) + ̺ = min
u∈U
{rµ(x, u) +
∫
X
Vµ(y)P (dy|x, u)}. (6.21)
Also an application of Tauberian theorem shows that
̺ ≤ ̺µ,
where ̺µ is given by (3.2). From (2.2) we obtain that
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
sup
v∈USM
E
v
x[V(Xn)] ≤
β2
β1
.
Since Vµ ∈ o(V) (or equivalently, using (6.20)) we have
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
sup
v∈USM
E
v
x[|Vµ(Xn)|] = 0, for all x ∈ X . (6.22)
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Let v˜ ∈ UDSM be a minimizing selector of (6.21) . For existence of measurable selector one
may refer [7, Proposition 7.33]. Then for any n ∈ N we have
Vµ(x) + n̺ = E
v˜
x
[n−1∑
i=0
rµ(Xi, v˜i(Xi))
]
+ Ev˜x[Vµ(Xn)].
Now dividing both sides by n and using (6.22) we get
̺ = lim
n→∞
1
n
E
v˜
x
[n−1∑
i=0
rµ(Xi, v˜i(Xi))
]
.
Thus
̺ = ̺µ = lim
n→∞
1
n
E
v˜
x
[n−1∑
i=0
rµ(Xi, v˜i(Xi))
]
, ∀ x ∈ X . (6.23)
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Existence of (Vµ, ̺) with Vµ ∈ o(V), ̺ = ̺µ, is shown in (6.21) and
(6.23). Now consider any pair (V, ̺) ∈ C(X ) × R with V (0) = 0, V ∈ o(V), that satisfies
V (x) + ̺ = min
u∈U
{rµ(x, u) +
∫
X
V (y)P (dy|x, u)}. (6.24)
It is easy to see that V satisfies (6.22). Hence an argument similar to above can be used to
show that ̺ = ̺µ. It is enough to show that V = Vµ where Vµ obtained as a subsequential
limit of {V¯ αµ }. Consider a point x0 ∈ C that lies in the support on ν (see (2.2)). Without
loss of generality we assume that x0 = 0. Define
Bκ := {x : dX (0, x) ≤ κ}, aκ := ν(Bκ). (6.25)
0 being in the support of ν we have aκ > 0 for all κ > 0. Now we recall that τ(A) denotes
the hitting/return time to A. Since by (2.3) we have
1C(x) ≤
1
γ aκ
inf
u∈U
P (Bκ|x, u),
we get from (2.2) that for any v ∈ USM,
E
v
x[V(Xτ(Bκ))] + β1 E
v
x
[ τ(Bκ)−1∑
i=0
V(Xi)
]
≤ V(x) + β2 E
v
x
[ τ(Bκ)−1∑
i=0
1C(Xi)
]
≤ V(x) +
β2
γaκ
E
v
x
[ τ(Bκ)−1∑
i=0
P (Bκ|Xi, v(Xi))
]
≤ V(x) +
β2
γaκ
. (6.26)
One can use similar argument as in (6.26) to obtain that
lim sup
n→∞
sup
v∈USM
E
v
x[V(Xn∧τ(Bκ))] <∞, ∀ κ > 0. (6.27)
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Since V ∈ o(V), using (6.27) we obtain that for any v ∈ USM
lim
n→∞
Ex[V (Xn∧τ(Bκ))] = limn→∞
Ex[1{n≥τ(Bκ)}V (Xτ(Bκ))] + limn→∞
Ex[1{n<τ(Bκ)}V (Xn)]
= Ex[V (Xτ(Bκ))]. (6.28)
Since there is a minimizing selector of (6.24) in UDSM we get from (6.26), (6.28) and domi-
nated convergence theorem that
V (x) = inf
v∈UDSM
Ex
[τ(Bκ)−1∑
i=0
(rµ(Xi, v(Xi))− ̺µ) + V (Xτ(Bκ))
]
, ∀ κ > 0. (6.29)
The infimum in (6.29) can be replaced by minimum since it is achieved by the minimizer
selector of (6.24). It is worth mentioning that similar expression of value function is known
for diffusion control problems [2, Chapter 3.7]. We observe that Vµ also satisfies equation
similar to (6.29). Now let v˜ be a minimizing selector of (6.24). Then v˜ would be sub-optimal
for Vµ. Hence from (6.29) we would get
Vµ(x) ≤ V (x) + sup
Bκ
Vµ − inf
Bκ
V, ∀ κ > 0.
Since V (0) = Vµ(0) = 0, letting κ → 0, we get that Vµ ≤ V . Similarly, we also obtain
V ≤ Vµ and thus V = Vµ.
Now we are remained to show that every optimal control v ∈ USM is a minimizing selector
of (6.24) in the sense that
Vµ(x) + ̺µ = rµ(x, v(x)) +
∫
X
Vµ(y)P (dy|x, v(x)), almost surely with respect to ηv.
(6.30)
Let (6.30) does not hold. Since the rhs of the above display is locally finite we can find
non-negative f 6= 0 in L∞(ηv), supported in some Bκ , that safisfies
Vµ(x) + ̺µ + f(x) = rµ(x, v(x)) +
∫
X
Vµ(y)P (dy|x, v(x)). (6.31)
Then using (6.31) and an argument as in (6.23) we have
̺µ = lim
n→∞
1
n
Ex
[ n−1∑
i=0
(
rµ(Xi, v(Xi))− f(Xi)
)]
= lim
n→∞
1
n
Ex
[ n−1∑
i=0
rµ(Xi, v(Xi))
]
−
∫
X
f(y) ηv(dy)
= ̺µ −
∫
X
f(y) ηv(dy),
by [24, Theorem 14.3.3] and the optimality of v. But this implies f = 0 almost surely with
respect to ηv which is a contradiction. This proves (6.30). 
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